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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-4518

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TERRANCE NALLS
a/k/a TERRANCE NOLLS
a/k/a TERRANCE KNOX
Terrance Nalls,
Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00073-1)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2008
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 8, 2008)

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

After pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Terrance Nalls was sentenced to 72 months in prison. He appeals his
sentence, arguing that the District Court failed to complete its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
analysis when it did not specifically explain its refusal to grant a variance. We will
affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only those facts essential
to our decision.
In 2006, Nalls and his brother were shot and injured by a group of unknown
assailants. Approximately three weeks later, Nalls was arrested while driving with a
firearm in the vicinity where he had been shot. Nalls pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) yielded an advisory Guideline range
of 70 to 87 months imprisonment. The parties agreed that a two-level enhancement for
reckless endangerment was appropriate pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), resulting in
an adjusted Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months imprisonment. Nalls requested a
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 and a downward variance pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553, arguing that self-preservation impelled him to carry the firearm after he
had been shot. The District Court granted a two-level downward departure on the
grounds of coercion and duress, but denied Nalls’s request for a variance, which resulted
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in a final adjusted Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months. The District Court then
sentenced Nalls to 72 months imprisonment.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s sentencing decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).
It is axiomatic that district courts must apply 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine
whether a variance from the Guidelines is warranted. See United States v. Gunter, 462
F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). The sentencing judge must also “acknowledge and respond
to any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a
factual basis.” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007). Nalls argues
that the District Court erred by failing to consider the specific basis for which he
requested a downward variance. The record does not support this argument.
First, the District Court considered and responded to Nalls’s argument in favor of a
downward variance. The District Court stated:
Now, as to your request for a variance under 3553(a), the Court
considered the facts and circumstances, as well as the prior facts and
circumstances precipitating your arrest on February 16; namely, the
shooting incident. The court found credible your statements that you acted
and committed the instant offense based on coercion and duress and the
Court found credible the fact that you had sustained critical injuries. And
the Court does find it very credible that you acted out of fear for your life.
But, in addition, the Court had to look at everything else that went on there
and I had to weigh your past history and conduct against what happened on
this particular evening.
...
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So after a review of all the facts and circumstances, after hearing the
testimony today, the argument here today, I looked at the seriousness of the
offense, I looked at the deterrence, I looked at protecting the public, I
looked at the sentences available, I looked at what had happened to others,
such as yourself, charged with similar conduct and, for all of those reasons,
came down to the sentence that I have imposed.
App. 244-45 (emphasis added). While specifically discussing the variance, the District
Court stated that it credited the argument advanced by Nalls, but that countervailing
considerations under § 3553(a) led the court to the sentence that it imposed. This
explanation is sufficient to show that the District Court “has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007).
Furthermore, the District Court discussed the shooting incident at length only
minutes before denying Nalls’s request for a variance. Nalls argues that this discussion
was insufficient because it occurred while the District Court was considering the
downward departure. However, “we will not elevate form over substance” when
reviewing sentencing decisions. United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir.
2006). Consequently, we will not require district courts to address the § 3553(a) factors
during specified times during a sentencing hearing. Rather, we will look at the entire
sentencing hearing to ascertain whether the sentencing judge gave meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. On the record, it is clear that the District Court did
just that.
III.
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The District Court adequately considered all the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, including the duress and coercion arguments advanced by Nalls. Accordingly,
the District Court did not commit procedural error in denying Nalls’s request for a
variance. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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